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Alexander Guryanov* 
While not denying the mass executions of Polish prisoners 
of war by the Soviet NKVD, Russian authorities currently only 
recognize the Katyn Massacre as an ordinary crime that is long 
time-barred. Only a few leaders of the NKVD have been found 
guilty of any crime, but their names are kept secret. The victims 
of the shooting and their families cannot seek relief under the 
Russian “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political 
Repression” law. Further, the most essential materials of the 
investigation, conducted by the Russian Main Military 
Prosecutor’s Office from 1990 through 2004, are classified. The 
Russian Memorial Society makes four demands necessary to 
achieve a legal resolution of the case of the Katyn Massacre in 
Russia: (1) adoption of an adequate legal definition of the Katyn 
Massacre as a war crime and a crime against humanity; (2) 
formal disclosure of the identities of all perpetrators, starting 
with Stalin and the Politbiuro members as initiators and ending 
with all the performers of shooting; (3) recognition in 
accordance with Russian legislation of all murdered Polish 
citizens as victims of political repression; and (4) 
declassification of all materials of the Katyn Massacre 
investigation. These demands have been repeatedly rejected 
between 2006 and 2011 by the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office 
and the Russian courts of all instances from the District Court 
up to the Supreme Court. This article details the Memorial 
*  Alexander Guryanov graduated in 1975 from the Physics Department of 
the State University of Moscow, received Ph. D. degree in Physics in 
1985, and in 1993 joined the Research, Information and Public 
Enlightenment Center within the Memorial Society in Moscow. Soon 
thereafter, he became the chief coordinator of the Polish Program of the 
Memorial Society. In this capacity he has authored many scientific 
articles on Soviet political repressions directed at the Poles and Polish 
citizens of other nationalities. He edited and co-authored a collective 
work entitled Repressions of the Poles and Polish Citizens of Other 
Nationalities, published in Moscow by the Memorial Society in 1997. He 
also co-edited and co-authored seventeen volumes of the Index of 
Repressed Persons series, published together with the Polish Karta 
Center between 1997 and 2010 in Warsaw. Since 2007, Dr. Guryanov 
has been officially representing the Memorial Society before the Russian 
courts in connection with numerous complaints filed by the Memorial 
against contemporary proceedings of the Russian state institutions with 
respect to the Katyn crime. 
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Society’s ongoing efforts to bring justice to the Katyn Massacre 
victims and their families.  
The Memorial Society, in addition to defending human rights in 
Russia, studies the history of political repression in the Soviet Union, 
documents the fate of repressed people, and assists in their moral and 
legal rehabilitation.1 The Memorial Society also promotes access to 
sources of information about the crimes of totalitarian regimes. By 
education I am not a historian and certainly am not a lawyer, but I 
work at the research center of the Memorial Society, and I am 
engaged in studies of the history of Soviet political repressions against 
Polish citizens. In recent years, I have dealt with certain legal issues 
in court proceedings on aspects of the Katyn Massacre as a 
representative of the Memorial Society. Mrs. Diana Sork is the main 
lawyer for the Memorial Society in court proceedings. 
The Memorial Society seeks the implementation of certain 
measures at the state level, without which a legal resolution of the 
case of Katyn Massacre in Russia is impossible. To this end, the 
Society makes four demands.  
First, the Memorial Society requests adoption of an adequate legal 
definition of the Katyn Massacre appropriate to its essence as an act 
of Soviet state terrorism. 
Second, there must be formal disclosure of the identities of all 
perpetrators, starting with those who ordered the massacre of 
thousands of Polish citizens and finishing with all those who carried 
out the extrajudicial executions. Although these actors are no longer 
alive, and thus cannot be tried in court, their names must be 
disclosed. 
Third, all victims of the Katyn Massacre must be recognized by 
name as victims of political repression in accordance with the current 
Russian law, On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression 
(the Act).2 According to the preamble of the Act, rehabilitation 
primarily requires official recognition that a particular person has 
been persecuted by the state for political reasons and that such 
1. Memorial, INT’L HISTORICAL-ENLIGHTENMENT HUMAN RIGHTS & 
HUMANITARIAN SOC’Y MEM’L, http://www.memo.ru/eng/ (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2013). 
2. О реабилитации жертв политических репрессий [Law on Rehabilitation of 
Victims of Political Repression], Ведомости Съезда народных депутатов 
России и Верховного Совета Российской Федерации [Gazette of the 
Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation and the 
Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation], Sept. 23, 1993, No. 28 
[hereinafter Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression]. See also 
Russia: Law on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression, in III 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH 
FORMER REGIMES: LAWS, RULINGS, AND REPORTS 797 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 
1995).  
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persecution is incompatible with law and justice.3 The consequence of 
rehabilitation under this Act is to provide benefits and compensation 
for the rehabilitated person, but not for his relatives. Nevertheless, 
official recognition that a particular person was a victim of political 
repression by the Soviet Union would be of great value for the 
relatives of executed Polish prisoners. On the other hand, for the 
Memorial Society it is equally important to ensure that the Russian 
state authorities comply with Russian laws, including the Act. 
Fourth, all materials of the Katyn Massacre investigation 
conducted by the Russian Main Military Prosecutor’s Office from 
1990 to 2004 must be declassified. 
Before presenting the current state of these efforts, it is necessary 
to review how the official position of the Soviet Union and Russia 
towards the Katyn Massacre changed over time. From the autumn of 
1941 to March 1943, Soviet authorities claimed they knew nothing 
about the fate of the Polish officers captured by the Soviets in 
September 1939.4 After the Germans announced the discovery of 
graves of the Polish officers in the Katyn Forest in April 1943, Soviet 
authorities claimed that the Nazis carried out this execution.5 Soviet 
authorities claimed the Nazis captured three Soviet camps near 
Smolensk, where Polish officers were kept, and executed the Polish 
officers in the summer of 1941.6 This official position was reflected in 
the final report of the Burdenko Commission, created in January 
1944, to investigate the shooting of Polish officers.7 The report was 
intended to promote the official, but untrue, Soviet version. The 
Burdenko Commission relied on evidence and eyewitness testimony 
that was subsequently found to be fabricated.8 
3. See Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression, supra note 2, at 
pmbl. (“The purpose of the present Law is to rehabilitation all victims 
of political repressions . . . to restore their civil rights, to eliminate other 
consequences of arbitrary rule, and to provide compensation for material 
and moral harm. . . .”).  
4. See J.K. ZAWODNY, DEATH IN THE FOREST: STORY OF THE KATYN 
FOREST MASSACRE 80–81 (1962). 
5. Records Relating to the Katyn Forest Massacre at the National 
Archives, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/research/for 
eign-policy/katyn-massacre/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).  
6. Id. 
7. See The Truth About Katyn, SOVIET WAR NEWS 1 (Supp. 1944) (“The 
Special Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the 
Circumstances of the Shooting of Polish Officer Prisoners by the 
German-Facist invaders in the Katyn Forest (near Smolensk) was set up 
on the decision of the Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining 
and Investigating Crimes Committed by the German-Facist Invaders 
and Their Associates.”). 
8. See Investigation of the Murder of Thousands of Polish Officers in the 
Katyn Forest Near Smolensk, Russia: Hearings Before the Select 
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Only in April 1990, under President Mikhail Gorbachev, did the 
Soviet Union acknowledge that Lavrentiy Beria, Vsevolod 
Nikolayevich Merkulov and their accomplices were guilty of the 
massacre of the Polish prisoners of war.9 In the official statement of 
the Governmental Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, the 
massacre was described as one of the serious crimes of Stalinism.10 In 
the autumn of 1990, the Soviet Main Military Prosecutor’s Office 
began to investigate the Katyn Massacre.11 After the Soviet Union’s 
disintegration, the Russian Main Military Prosecutor’s Office 
continued the criminal investigation. 
In October 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered the 
documents that show the extrajudicial execution of Polish citizens had 
been carried out on the order of the Soviet leadership be made 
public.12 The documents revealed that Joseph Stalin and five other 
members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party directly ordered the executions.13 However, this 
political position did not establish a legal obligation. The official 
Russian legal position was formulated only on September 21, 2004, 
when the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the criminal 
case due to the death of the accused.14 At the same time, the Main 
Military Prosecutor’s Office classified the investigation materials, 
including the decision to dismiss the case, as secret and top secret; 
this decision was not publicly announced until March 2005.15 The 
Main Military Prosecutor’s Office refused to reveal the perpetrators 
by name, saying only that they were a few leading officials of the 
Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and 
Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, 82nd Cong. 235–38, 247 
(1952) (discussing specific evidence of false testimony given by witnesses 
and other false evidence used in the Burdenko Commission reports). 
9. See Masha Hamilton, Gorbachev Documents Soviet Guilt at Katyn, LA 
TIMES, April 14, 1990, at 1.  
10. See id.  
11. See Richard J. Hunter, Katyn: Old Issues Threaten Polish-Russian 
Economic and Political Relations, 17 EUR. J. SOC. SCI. 288, 291 (2010). 
12. See id. (noting that on October 14, 1992, chief state archivist Rudolf 
Pichoja, a special envoy of Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, 
turned over official copies of original documents to Polish President 
Lech Walesa in Warsaw). 
13. See id.  
14. Michael P. Scharf & Maria Szonert-Binienda, Katyn: Justice Delayed Or 
Justice Denied? Report of the Cleveland Experts’ Meeting, 44 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 535, 539 (2011). 
15. See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 259 (Anna M. Cienciala, 
Natalia S. Lebedeva & Wojciech Materski eds., Marian Schwartz, Anna 
M. Cienciala & Maia A. Kipp trans., 2007). 
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NKVD and their actions qualified only as “exceeding their authority 
with serious consequences in the presence of particularly aggravating 
circumstances,” under paragraph b of Article 193–17 of the former 
Penal Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.16 
Thus, the main perpetrators—Stalin and the Politburo members—
were excluded from the circle of persons responsible for the Katyn 
Massacre, and the execution of 22,000 Polish citizens was qualified 
only as an ordinary crime that is subject to a ten-year statute of 
limitations.17 Those who carried out the execution, except a few 
NKVD leaders, were also not named as responsible parties. Only one 
explanation is possible: the Prosecutor’s Office does not consider 
carrying out a criminal order to be a crime. 
In 2005 to 2006, the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office completed 
its legal review of the Katyn Massacre and refused to consider 
whether each individual prisoner of war who was shot was an 
individual victim of political repression. Such a refusal is completely 
contrary to current Russian law.18 The formal reason for the 
Politburo’s March 5, 1940 decision on the execution of the Polish 
prisoners of war and inmates of prisons was a report from Beria to 
Stalin about the need to shoot these people, “based on the fact that 
all of them are steadfast incorrigible [sic] enemies of Soviet power       
. . . .”19 Thus, the political motive of the shooting is obvious. In spite 
of this, the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office refuses to recognize not 
only a political motive in the executions, but also refuses to recognize 
the very execution of each individual prisoner of war, referring to the 
absence of individualized documentary evidence. In other words, while 
not denying the mass executions of Polish prisoners of war, the Main 
Military Prosecutor’s Office gives no individual identity to the 
multitude of victims. Thus, the official legal position in the short term 
is this: the investigation is terminated; the materials are classified; the 
Katyn Massacre is an ordinary crime that is long time-barred; only a 
few leaders of the NKVD, but not Stalin and other members of the 
Soviet leadership, are guilty; and the victims of the shooting are not 
subject to rehabilitation. 
After March 2005, attempts were made to influence Russia’s 
official legal position. Applications to the Main Military Prosecutor’s 
Office on behalf of a number of massacre victims were made for 
16. Letter from the International Memorial Society Board to President 
Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation regarding the 70th 
Anniversary of the Katyn Massacre (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http:// 
hro.rightsinrussia.info/archive/stalin/memorial-on-katyn. 
17. See Scharf & Szonert-Binienda, supra note 14, at 537.  
18. Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression, supra note 2, art. 2.  
19. Excerpts: Beria Letter to Stalin on Katyn, BBC (Apr. 28, 2010), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8649435.stm.  
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rehabilitation in accordance with the On the Rehabilitation of Victims 
of Political Repression law. The Memorial Society submitted sixteen 
of these applications in 2006 as the first step to initiate 
rehabilitation.20 Relatives of ten other victims filed applications for 
rehabilitation, including the son (currently living in the United 
States) of one of the executed prisoners of war. Moscow lawyers Anna 
Stavitskaya and Roman Karpinsky, acting independently of the 
Memorial Society, represent these victims. 
The Memorial Society and other individual claimants have 
appealed the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office’s refusal to execute 
the On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression law in 
relation to the Katyn Massacre in the Russian courts of first, second, 
and supervisory instances—the Khamovnichesky District Court of 
Moscow, the Moscow Military District Court, the Moscow City Court, 
the Presidium of the Moscow City Court, and the Supreme Court of 
the Russian Federation. Family members of executed prisoners of war, 
in addition to the rehabilitation, demanded reversal of the Main 
Military Prosecutor’s Office’s decision to dismiss the Katyn criminal 
case. The family members seek to reopen the investigation, 
acknowledgment of the status of victims for them in accordance to 
Russian Criminal Procedure Code, and the opportunity to get 
acquainted with case materials. All of the above named courts denied 
the appeals,21 thus affirming the legal position of the Main Military 
Prosecutor’s Office as the official position of Russia. As a result, the 
Memorial Society and other applicants were forced to turn to the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, asserting 
that Russia has violated the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.22 Currently, the Court considers the 
claim of ten families of executed Polish officers as a priority.23 The 
Memorial Society is waiting for their complaint to reach the courts as 
well.  
In 2006 and 2008, the Memorial Society submitted requests to the 
Main Military Prosecutor’s Office to declassify the key document of 
the Katyn case investigation—namely, the resolution on its 
termination. According to the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, the 
resolution to dismiss a criminal case must contain all the results of 
the investigation.24 The Memorial Society considers declassification of 
20. See Inessa Jazhborovskaya, The Katyn Case: Working to Learn the 
Truth, RUSS. ACAD. SCI. SOC. SCI., 2011, at 34, 42. 
21. See Janowiec and Others v. Russia, Judgment,  App. Nos. 55508/07, 
29520/09, ¶¶ 53, 58, 63, 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R., 2012). 
22. See id. ¶ 1.  
23. See id. ¶ 5.  
24. UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UPK RF] 
[Criminal Procedural Code], art. 213 (Russ.). 
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this important document the first step to opening all the closed 
materials of the Katyn investigation. Under Article 7 of the On State 
Secrets law, classification of information about violations of human 
rights and freedoms of man and citizen, as well as information about 
violations of law by governmental authorities and their officials, is 
prohibited.25 The Memorial Society appealed the Main Military 
Prosecutor’s Office’s refusal to perform the procedure assigned by the 
On State Secrets law, in the Khamovnichesky district court of 
Moscow. Unfortunately, this court of first instance, and then the 
Moscow City Court, in which the Memorial Society filed a cassation 
appeal, found no violations in the actions of the Main Military 
Prosecutor’s Office.26 
In 2009, the Memorial Society turned to Russia’s highest state 
authority in the area of secrecy—the Interdepartmental Commission 
for the Protection of State Secrets. This department is supervised by 
the president of the Russian Federation.27 The Memorial Society 
demanded the decision to classify Main Military Prosecutor’s Office’s 
resolution to dismiss the criminal Katyn case be overturned. The 
Interdepartmental Commission denied the Memorial Society’s appeal. 
The Memorial Society appealed this decision at the Moscow City 
Court, which, on November 2, 2010, ruled that the actions of the 
Main Military Prosecutor’s Office and the Interdepartmental 
Commission were legitimate. Despite the Moscow City Court’s 
flagrant violations of the Civil Procedure Code, the Supreme Court of 
the Russian Federation upheld the decision.28 Thus, the Memorial 
Society is now faced with the need to send a supervisory complaint to 
the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
concerning the illegality of the classification of key material of the 
Katyn case, as well as the next complaint to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
There are two particular features of the Memorial Society’s 
applications to the courts worth noting. First, although the Memorial 
Society does not reject the possibility of recourse to international 
justice, the Memorial Society would prefer to achieve resolution of the 
Katyn case in the Russian courts. The Memorial Society considers the 
Katyn case primarily an internal problem of Russia itself, and only 
then as the problem of Russian-Polish relations. Second, appeals on 
25. See Janowiec and Others v. Russia, App. Nos. 55508/07, 29520/09, ¶ 60.  
26. See id. ¶¶ 55−58 (discussing the private nature of the proceedings for 
declassification and mentioning the disconnect between the City Court 
and the European Court of Human Rights). 
27. See id. ¶ 60. 
28. See Russian Supreme Court Upholds Closure of Katyn Massacre Case, 
RIANOVOSTI (Jan. 29, 2009, 3:55PM), http://en.rian.ru/russia/200901 
29/119870665.html.  
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the Katyn case decision filed by the Memorial Society in the Russian 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights are complaints of 
violation of the right of the Memorial Society to carry out its 
statutory activities and its right to a fair trial. These are differences 
from court cases brought by relatives of executed prisoners of war, 
who complain of a Russian violation of their own rights as victims. 
However, in 2010, a new situation arose. After seventeen years of 
silence, the Russian authorities at last articulated Russia’s political 
position on the Katyn Massacre. Prime Minister Vladamir Putin, and 
then more definitively President Dmitry Medvedev, publicly voiced 
their opinion about Stalin’s culpability in the massacre of Polish 
citizens. On November 26, 2010, the State Duma of the Russian 
Federation made its first public statement noting the personal 
responsibility of Stalin and his associates as the main perpetrators of 
Katyn Massacre.29 In 2010, copies of 137 of the 183 volumes of 
unclassified materials of the Russian investigation of the Katyn 
criminal case were handed over to Poland.30 But none of the other 
thirty-six secret or top secret volumes has yet been declassified and 
handed over.31 On January 26, 2011, President Medvedev’s press 
office commented that the declassification of Katyn materials is 
ongoing and the copies will be transferred to Poland.32 Formally, there 
is no contradiction: the recognition of the classification as legal in the 
past does not preclude the declassification in the future. Despite the 
recent decision of the Russian Supreme Court, some shift of Russia’s 
official position may occur, at least on the declassification. 
In general, the political declarations on the Katyn case are 
welcome, but the contradiction between the statements of Russian 
authorities and the legal position of the Main Military Prosecutor’s 
Office, which has remained unchanged since 2004 and was regularly 
confirmed by the Russian courts, has now become more striking. 
While the legal position of the Russian state will not be aligned with 
political declarations, the case of the Katyn Massacre in Russia is not 
closed. 
 
 
29. See Russian Parliament Condemns Stalin for Katyn Massacre, BBC 
(Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11845315.  
30. Russia Considers Rehabilitating Polish Servicemen, RT (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://rt.com/politics/russia-poland-katyn-ambassador/.  
31. Scharf & Szonert-Binienda, supra note 14, at 542.  
32. See id.  
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